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An Overlooked Insight of the Tractatus 
Mariana Saavedra 
 
Richard Rorty begins the introduction to his 
magnum opus Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(hereafter PMN) as follows:  
 
Philosophers usually think of their discipline as one 
which discusses the perennial, eternal problems –
problems which arise as soon as one reflects. Some 
of these concern the difference between human 
beings and other beings, and are crystallized in 
questions concerning the relation between the minds 
and the body. Other questions concern the 
legitimation of claims to know, and are crystallized 
in questions concerning the “foundations” of 
knowledge. To discover these foundations is to 
discover something about the mind, and conversely.1 
 
This account of philosophy is largely uncontroversial. 
Few would deny that the history of philosophy has dealt 
at some point or another with these problems. For Rorty, 
philosophy’s problems stem precisely from the fact that 
this definition of philosophy is uncontroversial. He does 
not deny that these problems have been of tremendous 
significance to the tradition; he in fact sees them as 
having single-handedly shaped the entire tradition. He 
sees traditional philosophy as captive in a picture of the 
human mind as a great mirror2 and all of its problems as 
implications of this.  
 The history of philosophy can hence be 
summarized in the history of our conception of the 
mind. If its purpose is to adjudicate claims of 
                                                
1 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 3 
2 ibid., p. 12 
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knowledge by revealing their foundations, then the 
nature of the “knowers” is central. Rorty’s project is to 
deconstruct the notion of “knowers” as beings with 
minds as great mirrors, and thereby show the confusion 
of the epistemological project that has dominated 
philosophy for so long. He constructs a two-pronged 
attack on the traditional notions of mind and meaning, 
which he sees as closely related; the dissolution of one 
is crucial to the dissolution of the other. His 
deconstruction includes several positions, which he 
adopts from different philosophers. From 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations, and Quine and Davidson, 
he adopts holism of meaning: language is a whole 
whose meanings are determined by the relation in 
which they stand with other parts of language, and all 
meanings and relationships among them are determined 
by use. From there, he advocates a parsimony of 
ontology by advocating Davidson’s thoroughgoing 
holism which sees linguistic and non linguistic behavior 
as continuous, and non-reductive physicalism which 
“amounts to the claim that a given event can be 
described equally well in physiological, non-intentional 
and intentional terms” 3 . This view dissolves the 
traditional problems of epistemology as it implies that 
“[t]he difference between mind and body –between 
reasons and causes- is thus no more mysterious than, 
e.g., the relation between a macro-structural and a 
micro-structural description of a table”4. It also implies 
that language does not have a “making true” but a 
causal relationship to the world by which we are “to 
think of human beings [as] trading marks and noises to 
                                                
3 Ibid., “Non-reductive Physicalism” in Objectivity, Relativism and 
Truth (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.114.  
4 Ibid. 
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accomplish purposes” 5 . This leads Rorty to the 
following conclusion:  
 
In this model the distinction between Self and World 
has been replaced with the distinction between an 
individual human being (describable in both mental 
and physical terms) and the rest of the universe. The 
former is limited by the contours of the body, and 
the task of explaining the relations between events 
occurring within that boundary and all other events 
is a matter of postulating, or observing, entities 
within these contours: inner causes of human being’s 
behavior. These causes include both micro-structural 
and macro-structural, and both mental and physical, 
items: among them are hormones, positrons, neural 
synapses, beliefs, desires, moods, diseases and 
multiple personalities.6 
 
When the self is the human being, it is in the world: 
there is no ontological gap to separate it from the world. 
Like anything else in the world it can be described in 
terms of a “self” for the sake of convenience, or in 
terms of what it feels, believes, says, does, etc. which 
are all part of what it is. 
 It is very surprising that given his infinite 
admiration for Wittgenstein, Rorty does not 
acknowledge that Wittgenstein had in the Tractatus7 
advanced a view of the self that is coherent with the 
view he advocates. Furthermore, Wittgenstein himself 
does not explicitly delve into issues of the self in the 
Investigations. Though Rorty considers the 
                                                
5 Ibid., “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language” 
in Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 58.  
6 Op cit., p.121. 
7 All references to the Tractatus refer to Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. 
McGuiness (New York, Routledge, 2002). 
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Investigations to be Wittgenstein’s most important 
work and a most decisive advance towards the 
‘naturalization’ he advocates, he does recognize some 
of the advances that had been made in the Tractatus. 
For example, he considers Wittgenstein’s recognition of 
the third-man problem in Russell’s relationship between 
logic and the world, and his postulation of logic as in 
the world, a first step towards naturalization8. It is 
therefore all the more surprising that he does not 
acknowledge the Tractatus’ forward-thinking remarks 
on the self.  In this essay I wish to elucidate the 
similarities between the Tractarian and Rorty’s versions 
of the self and thereby show another way in which the 
Tractatus contributed to naturalization.  
 Within the context of the Tractatus the rationale 
behind dissolving the self is that thoughts, in the sense 
that they are representations, must be part of reality so 
that it can be necessary that they share logical form. 
The discussion of the self begins in 5.6. where it 
becomes relevant to the discussion because belief-
sentences appear to present a problem if Wittgenstein’s 
grand theory of meaning is to be truth-conditional: 
belief-sentences do not yield propositions whose truth-
functions are determined by their parts. Fogelin 
expounds on the reasons why the subject is problematic 
when he writes: “Suppose that the subject were another 
object in the world which, through thinking, puts a set 
of objects (the thought) into representational 
relationship with the world. If this were the case, the 
meaning of every proposition would depend upon the 
truth of another for it would be a contingency that the 
required relationship obtains between the subject (one 
object in the world) and the thought (another set of 
                                                
8 See “Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language” in 
Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 54. 
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objects in the world)”9. Meaningfulness comes from the 
identity of structure of the form of representation with 
that which it represents. As the Tractatus has argued, 
only structure, logical form, is necessary.  As the actual 
states of affairs in which objects stand are contingent, 
“if the thinking self were part of the world it would 
stand in a contingent relationship to its thoughts”10, 
making the ‘showing’ relationship a contingent one. 
Wittgenstein says this explicitly when he says in 
proposition 5.634 that “… no part of our experience is 
at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be 
other than it is. Whatever we can describe at all could 
be other than it is. There is no a priori order of things.”  
 One of main problems of the Tractatus is that 
given the fact that the world is just the totality of facts, 
there seems to be the need for a thinking subject to 
discriminate between just facts and facts that stand in 
representation of other facts. Not all facts are 
meaningful, so there needs to be a subject to see that 
meaning. This is a problem of the picture theory of 
meaning and the notion that the world can be analyzed 
down to simple objects. The picture theory requires that 
the self be another object for the reasons outlined above, 
yet at the same seems to presuppose that subject.  It is 
the picture theory of meaning that is incoherent and not 
the notion of the self. When the picture theory, which 
requires determinate objects, is abandoned for a notion 
of meaning as established by use, Wittgenstein’s 
insights on the absolute necessity of the subject to be 
part of the world, and of the contents of the mind to be 
in direct relationship with it, still stands.  
                                                
9 Robert J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein: The Arguments of the 
Philosophers (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Boston, 1976), p. 85.  
10 Ibid. For a similar explanation see also Jaakko Hintikka “On 
Wittgenstein’s ‘Solipsism’”, in Mind, New Series, Vol. 67, No. 
265 (Jan., 1958), 88-91. p. 89. 
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 Wittgenstein fully develops his view of the self 
with his remarks on solipsism. He begins by saying in 
5.6 “the limits of my language are the limits of my 
world”, and continues to explain how this must be so 
because logic does not determine what there is in the 
world, so the world must limit language.  Furthermore 
there are no limitations on the subject because, as 
explained earlier, there cannot be anything that 
necessarily belongs to the subject as the only necessary 
relations are those determined by logic. From this he 
can say in the next proposition: 
This remark provides the key to the problem, how 
much truth there is in solipsism.  
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; 
only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.  
The world is my world: this is manifest in 
the fact that the limits of language (of that language 
which alone I understand) mean the limits of my 
world. 
 
He continues then, in the subsequent propositions to fill 
out his conception of the self, based on this11.  
In his analysis of Wittgenstein’s solipsism 
Jaakko Hintikka says that we must recognize the 
linguistic nature of the metaphysical subject in the 
Tractatus; that we must grant him a further 
consequence of the view he discusses12. Given the 
system that the Tractatus constructs there is no other 
way to understand the subject than as the sum total of 
the propositions in the mind. Wittgenstein has already 
in proposition 5.421 after first introducing the issue of 
beliefs, claimed that “there is no such things as the soul 
–the subject, etc- as it is conceived in the superficial 
                                                
11 This group of propositions much like the entire Tractatus must 
be taken as a whole rather than a succession in order to be fully 
understood.  
12 Hintikka “On Wittgenstein’s Solipsism”  
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psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul 
would no longer be a soul.”  Like many issues in the 
Tractatus one cannot understand this until one has 
understood the Tractatus in its totality and one needs 
this particular issue in order to understand the totality in 
the first place. Given this, it makes sense that 
Wittgenstein can say in proposition 5.64: “Here it can 
be seen that solipsism, when its implications are 
followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The 
self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension 
and there remains the reality coordinated with it”. The 
implied argument is the following: if the subject is the 
totality of its propositions and there is no such thing as 
its propositions (because there are no necessary 
relations between objects), then its propositions are all 
the propositions.  
 Within Rorty’s view, there is no such thing as 
the limit between language and the world. It is not that 
their limits coincide but that there simply is no limit. 
This is the implication of Davidson’s thoroughgoing 
holism, developed in his “On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme”. Language turns out to have no 
limits of its own and be a part of the world just like 
anything else and therefore have its limits. There is 
nothing in the Tractarian view of the self that is 
contradictory with this. By getting rid of the 
picturing/pictured division of facts, Rorty dissolves the 
need to have a subject to discriminate between the two, 
which as mentioned before was one of the main 
problems of the Tractatus.   
 The early Wittgenstein’s view of the self is 
furthermore compatible with Rorty’s in that it rejects 
behaviorism in the same manner. In propositions 5.63 
and the following, Wittgenstein indicates that he does 
not deny that there is such a thing as a point of view, 
even if the subject is not a closed entity. Hintikka 
explains that there “ is nothing private and nothing 
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psychological about Wittgenstein’s notion of a thought. 
Like Frege’s Gedanke, it can be shared by different 
people. In the Tractatus the propositional signs are 
completely public, and so is that which “does not get 
expressed in the signs”; for if it were private, it could 
not be “shown by their application” (3.262). And the 
limits of the metaphysical subject cannot be the limits 
of one’s actual thoughts, for there is nothing necessary 
about that limitation.”13 Thus Wittgenstein’s reasons 
for endorsing solipsism have “nothing to do with the 
classification of elementary propositions into ‘mine’ 
and ‘yours’”14 and therefore have nothing to do with the 
troubles related to other minds which lead to 
behaviorism.  
 Rorty responds to accusations of having left out 
the “the view from inside” from his model (basically of 
being a behaviorist), by saying that this internal view 
discloses some but not all of the internal causes of a 
human being, and discloses them under “mental 
descriptions”. “That is, what the individual human 
being identifies as ‘himself’ or ‘herself’ is, for the most 
part, his or her beliefs and desires, rather than the 
organs, cells, and particles which compose his or her 
body” 15 .  He or she considers those particular 
descriptions as part of his or herself because that is 
what makes sense within the web of his or her beliefs. 
“The fact that human beings can be aware of certain of 
their psychological states is not, on this view, any more 
mysterious than that they can be trained to report on the 
presence of adrenalin in their bloodstreams, or on their 
body temperature, or on a lack of flow of blood on their 
extremities. Ability to report is not a matter of 
‘presence of consciousness’ but simply of teaching the 
                                                
13 Hintikka, p.90-91.  
14 Ibid., p.91.   
15 Rorty, “Non-reductive Physicalism”, p. 121.  
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use of words.” 16  The notion of self is then to be 
understood as within a language game in which the 
particular psychological states are included and not a 
separate ontological entity and in which the collection 
of those descriptions is seen as “being the self rather 
than as something which the self has” 17 . Rorty 
concludes then that  
 
Kant’s argument that the “I think” must accompany 
all my representations can (…) be construed not as 
an argument for a quasi-substantial background for 
beliefs and desires (…) but simply as a way of 
pointing out that to have on belief or desire is 
automatically to have many – that to have a belief or 
desire is to have one strand of a large web. The “I” 
which is presupposed by any given representations is 
just the rest of the representations which are 
associated with the first –associated not by being 
“synthesized” but by being parts of the same 
network, the network of beliefs and desires which 
must be postulated as inner causes of the linguistic 
behavior of a single organism.18  
 
By this, as with Wittgenstein, any accusations of 
behaviorism are simply trapped in Cartesianism, 
because what they are claiming is being denied is 
precisely the Cartesian self.  
Though Wittgenstein claimed to have rejected 
the Tractatus before writing the Investigations, it is 
issues such as this one that show us that the insights of 
the Investigations would not have been possible without 
some of the insights that he had developed in the 
Tractatus. The similarities between Rorty’s pragmatist-
naturalist view of the self and the Tractarian view of the 
self should make us take seriously the claim that the 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 ibid., p. 123. 
18 Ibid.  
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belief in a closed ontologically separate self is 
incoherent with the web of language games that we 
seem to have. This should be all the more convincing 
given the fact that such a view appears in a work which 
still held language to have a ‘making true’ relationship 
to the world.  
 
 
